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I. INTRODUCTION 
Integrated broadband networks (IBNs) will use fiberoptic technol-
ogy to transmit large amounts of information, ranging from high-speed 
data to entertainment programming, to business and residential users. 
Currently, experimental fiberoptic links can carry the equivalent of 
several thousand television channels. By comparison, state-of-the-art 
cable television systems only offer about seventy channels. IBN s thus 
have the potential of increasing the bandwidth available for business 
and home applications by several orders of magnitude. 
Deployment of IBN s is still far in the future. Observers differ as 
to when IBNs may become economically viable. Predictions, however, 
range from the next decade to the next millennium. Nevertheless, 
policy makers already have begun analyzing potential regulatory 
policies for IBN S.l Naturally, a key question in this analysis is defining 
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1. INTEGRATED BROADBAND NETWORKS: THE PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES (M.C.J. Elton 
ed., forthcoming). 
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how IBN s fit into the present regulatory regime. IBN s' interaction 
with regulatory and legal norms will influence their development. This 
interaction also may affect the legal and regulatory policies applicable 
to traditional media by changing underlying policy assumptions. 
This discussion will focus primarily on V.S. economic policies, 
drawn from the Communications Act of 19342 and the V. S. antitrust 
laws. 3 Thus, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the 
District Court for the District of Columbia (D.C. District Court) are 
of major concern. 4 The focus on economic and antitrust policy is not 
to diminish the importance of other legal or regulatory issues. Common 
law principles are relevant in a variety of ways. For example, the 
allocation of defamation liability between speaker and carrier might 
have a substantial impact on a network's structure. 5 State regulatory 
authorities also may play an increasingly significant role in IBN devel-
opment, in terms of both telecommunications and industrial policy. 
For example, some agencies have recently liberalized their restraints 
on local telephone companies to promote investment in fiber, while 
others have encouraged consortia of networks and users to develop 
IBNs. 
II. REGULATORY STATUS OF IBN 
Historically, different types of media have required different consti-
tutional and regulatory treatment. As the Supreme Court has stated ad 
infinitum, "differences in the characteristics of new media justify dif-
ferences in the First Amendment standards applied to them . . . ."6 
Over the years, American jurisprudence has created a spectrum of 
possible constitutional and regulatory statuses for the media. This 
spectrum runs from no regulation at all to close scrutiny. A newspaper 
is subject to virtually no economic regulation and has complete editorial 
2. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (1988). 
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-5201 (1988). The most significant exegesis on antitrust policy in the 
context of the telecommunications industry has come from the divestiture of the American 
Telephone & Telegraph Company (AT&T), under the aegis of Judge Harold H. Greene in the 
Modification of Final Judgment. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 
(D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). 
4. The FCC regulates the rates and services offered by telecommunications firms. The 
courts adjudicate disputes as to anti-competitive practices or structure. 
5. For an excellent discussion of common law and statutory principles, see M. Meyerson, 
3 U. FLA. J.L. & POL'y 49 (1990). 
6. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. 
v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1948) (The Court acknowledged that the medium of broadcasting 
possesses a first amendment interest but, reflective of the different technologies employed in 
this particular form of communication, different first amendment standards would apply.). 
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responsibility,7 as well as liability, for its contents. A local exchange 
telephone company (LEe), however, is subject to relatively strict 
financial scrutiny even in a deregulated environment and has no control 
over, or liability for, the contents of its transmissions. s 
Over the last decade, the positions of various electronic media have 
become increasingly unclear. Traditionally, most observers viewed 
broadcast media as less protected than print, and cable as less than 
broadcasting. 9 However, in several recent lower court cases, cable 
operators have had some success in establishing themselves as "elec-
tronic publishers,"l0 and therefore immune from traditional economic 
regulation. If this trend prevails, it could redefine the regulatory spec-
trum. 
In terms of the regulatory spectrum, this discussion will focus on 
the two polar extremes: freedom from regulation and traditional public 
utility regulation. The first inquiry is whether IBN s should be subject 
to regulation at all. Assuming that IBN s should be, the second question 
is defining the proper type of regulation: that is, whether IBN s would 
be best suited for conventional rate-of-return regulation as opposed 
to informal price monitoring. 11 The increasingly large number of reg-
7. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). (The Supreme Court held that 
a Florida statute granting political candidates the right to reply to editorials attacking their 
personal character was an unconstitutional violation of the newspaper's first amendment rights.). 
8. See Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989). 
9. E.g., Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
375 U.S. 951 (1963). 
10. E.g., Home Box Office v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Involved a challenge to 
rules intended to prevent the siphoning of programming from over the air "free" TV to cable. 
The court emphasized that the scarcity rationale, which limits the first amendment rights of 
broadcasters due to the limited amount of available space on the electromagnetic spectrum, was 
not applicable to cable and therefore that cable operators were to be afforded a greater degree 
of first amendment protection.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. 
FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Involved a challenge to the "must carry rules" which 
required cable operators to carry the signal of any "local" broadcast station. Once again, the 
court held that cable operators were entitled to a greater degree of first amendment protection 
than broadcasters. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the scarcity rationale did 
not apply to cable operators and that the use of public rights of way does not warrant intrusion 
into a cable operator's first amendment rights.); Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985) 
(The court struck down as unconstitutional a Miami ordinance intended to regulate indecent and 
obscene material on cable television. In rejecting an argument to apply the rationale of Pacifica, 
the court noted that cable lacked the pervasiveness of broadcasting and was therefore entitled 
to a greater degree of first amendment protection.). So far, the Supreme Court effectively has 
not passed on the question of defining cable's first amendment rights, other than acknowledging 
that the medium has some. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 
488 (1986). 
11. See infra note 68. 
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ulatory permutations and combinations could subject new media to 
"hybrid" regulation, combining aspects of the traditional print, broad-
cast, and public utility approaches. 12 The dichotomy between print and 
public utility models is the most significant, since a decision to treat 
IBN s as common carriers would answer a variety of other questions. 
Although common carrier status requires offering adequate service to 
all paying customers at reasonable rates, the extent of regulation may 
vary.13 Thus, the narrow issue is identifying the most appropriate type 
of common carrier regulation. 
In contrast, classification of IBN s as hybrids instead of common 
carriers would require creation of a totally new regime, an endeavor 
which only after more than two decades is beginning to stabilize U. S. 
cable television regulation. 14 This is not to suggest, however, that 
common carrier regulation of IBN would avoid policy decisions, but 
rather that the initial regulatory classification is very significant. Due 
to IBN s' limited development, the definitional task is difficult. Despite 
the commercial and academic interest in IBN s, they may not exist as 
a viable economic entity until well into the next century.15 Neverthe-
less, some preliminary observations are necessary regarding IBN s' 
regulatory classification and treatment. 
The traditional reason for classifying an entity as a public utility, 
or more specifically as a common carrier, is the entity's natural 
monopoly characteristics. 16 A declining cost curve dictates not only 
that a dominant firm can keep all others out, but also that a single 
firm can offer consumers the lowest possible price. 17 The establishment 
of a legal monopoly requires a variety of attendant consumer protec-
tions, such as the regulations involved with common carriers, because 
of the monopoly's ability to charge supracompetitive prices and/or 
provide inferior service. 
12. In the context of telecommunications, of course, public utility treatment translates into 
the subset of common carrier regulation. For example, the FCC has reclassified, as "private 
radio," media previously subject to either broadcast or common carrier regulation. Hammond, 
To Be or Not to Be: FCC Regulation of Video Subscription Technologies, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 
737 (1986). 
13. See infra note 74 and accompanying text. 
14. See, e.g., Meyerson, Cable Television's New Legal Universe: Early Judicial Response 
to the Cable Act, 6 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1987). 
15. Johnson & Reed, Residential Broadband Services by Telephone Companies?, TECHNOL-
OGY, ECONOMICS & PUBLIC POLICY 41 (1990). 
16. Natural monopoly status naturally would allow a firm to raise prices or decrease services, 
because of the absence of any competition. 
17. E.g., C. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 35-65 (1984). 
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Translating this phenomenon into legal terms is problematic. The 
FCC and the courts have been unable to craft a satisfactory definition 
of common carriage in more than fifty years of regulation. 18 However, 
the basic concept is simple: a common carrier either holds itself out 
by its business practices or is required by law to serve any qualified 
customer.19 Yet, the Communications Act of 1934 failed to clearly 
delineate the classification, by circularly defining a "common carrier" 
as "a common carrier for hire in interstate or foreign communication 
by wire or radio or in interstate or foreign radio transmission of 
energy."20Furthermore, the FCC added little by defining a "communi-
cations common carrier" as "any person engaged in rendering com-
munication service for hire to the public."21 Finally, the courts have 
continued to complicate the issue. As the D.C. Circuit remarked in a 
seminal case: 
One may be a common carrier though the nature of the 
service rendered is sufficiently specialized as to be of possible 
use to only a fraction of the total population. . . . But a 
carrier will not be a common carrier where its practice is to 
make individualized decisions, in particular cases, whether 
and on what terms to deal. 22 
Thus, common carriage appears to include any general offering of 
communications service to any class of consumers, allowing the FCC 
and the courts a large degree of discretion. 
Consequently, although the common carrier rationale should apply 
only to a natural monopoly, the FCC has imposed some common carrier 
obligations upon firms that clearly were not natural monopolies. 23 
18. See infra note 22. 
19. 47 C.F.R. § 21.2 (1989). 
20. 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1982). 
21. 47 C.F.R. § 21.2 (1989). 
22. National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630,641 (D.C. Cir. 1976) 
(While addressing an FCC proposal to allocate spectrum space for use as mobile radio, the court 
stated it was unnecessary that a common carrier be required to serve all indiscriminately; it 
was enough that its practice was, in fact, to do so. Further, one must look to how the service 
functions; if it looks like a common carrier, it will be regulated as one.), em. denied, 425 U.S. 
992 (1976) [footnotes omitted]. Cf National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 533 
F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Challenge to FCC's attempt to preempt state common carrier regu-
lation over the use of cable system leased access channels for two-way, point-to-point, nonvideo 
communication. The court noted that one may be a common carrier by virtue of the actual 
activities carried out. Moreover, the court continued, one can be a common carrier with regard 
to some activities but not others.). 
23. See, e.g., supra note 5 (the discussion of MMDS). 
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Nevertheless, the statute seems to contemplate that a firm have some 
natural monopoly characteristics before treating it as a common car-
rier. 
IBN s may require common carrier status for two different reasons. 
First, IBN s could evolve into natural monopolies. Second, and perhaps 
more likely, IBNs may be owned by a natural monopoly, such as 
LEGs. Under the second alternative, common carrier regulation would 
be necessary to prevent a parent company from subsidizing an IBN 
with revenue earned by virtue of its natural monopoly status, or, 
conversely, from buying IBN services at artificially high prices. The 
former situation would be equivalent to AT&T's pre-divestiture sub-
sidy of its Bell Operating Gompanies (BOGs) from long distance rev-
enues. 24 The latter compares to the BOGs' "goldplating" of their plants 
through buying equipment at supracompetitive prices from AT&T's 
unregulated manufacturing arm.25 Realistically, natural monopoly-
owned IBN s may ultimately require common carrier regulation, if 
only for political reasons. 
If not owned by a natural monopoly, such as an LEG or another 
common carrier, an IBN might not require common carrier regulation. 
IBN technology is far from settled. Whether IBN s will exhibit charac-
teristics of a natural monopoly remains questionable. If IBNs do follow 
the traditional pattern of telecommunication carriers, they would need 
sophisticated central office switches and network control equipment. 26 
The high cost of these items would probably create a declining cost 
curve, a key characteristic of a natural monopoly.27 
Whether IBNs will develop along these lines remains unclear. In 
general, the current United States telecommunications industry relies 
increasingly on decentralized facilities - leading to the christening of 
"the geodesic network."28 Furthermore, some observers theorize that 
an IBN's massive channel capacity will require relatively little centrali-
zation since the large amount of bandwidth available for network over-
head could enable users to perform many of the switching and control 
24. See supra note 17, at 621-644. 
25. Id. 
26. The former for route trafficking between customers of the local exchange; the latter 
for long-distance calls to the appropriate networks. 
27. See supra note 17. 
28. Peter W. Huber, The Geodesic Network: 1987 Report on Competition in the Telephone 
Industry l.31-.36 (1987). Dr. Huber drafted his report as a consultant to the Antitrust Division 
of the Department of Justice, in preparation for its recommendations to the D.C. District Court 
on its first review of the Modification of Final Judgment. 
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functions.29 Whether and to what extent this turns out to be the case, 
of course, is sheer speculation. Nevertheless, this possibility might 
give one pause before imposing strict common carrier regulation at 
such an early phase in IBN development. This consideration might be 
mooted, however, if present common carriers own IBN systems. Since 
both long distance and local exchange carriers seem likely candidates 
for IBN operations, common carrier regulation may be necessary, if 
only to prevent past problems with cross-subsidization and goldplating. 
In sum, IBN s are likely candidates for common carrier regulation, 
because of the natural monopoly characteristics associated with them 
or their parent companies. If IBNs are regulated as common carriers, 
the next question is: to what extent should traditional common carrier 
policies be altered in order to adapt to IBNs' potential characteristics? 
III. REGULATION OF IBN PRACTICES 
Regulation of a firm's practices depends largely upon an industry's 
characteristics. The number of firms and amount of competition are 
particularly important, since the greater the atomistic nature of an 
industry, the lesser the likelihood of monopolistic or cartel-like be-
havior. This consideration again highlights the significance of IBN s 
natural monopoly status. 
If only one firm can operate in a field, more concern arises with 
respect to potential exclusionary conduct. For example, allowing cable 
operators, particularly vertically integrated ones, to operate IBNs 
could create incentives for excluding third-party programming. 
Moreover, if an IBN were considered a natural monopoly, allowing a 
cable operator to control the IBN would compound concerns. 
Alternatively, if IBNs compete within the same field, little reason 
would exist to prevent one or more cable operators from controlling 
an IBN. This approach would be somewhat similar to the FCC's reg-
ulation of cellular radio.30 For cellular radio, the FCC allocates half 
of the available spectrum in each market to groups of "wireline" car-
riers, such as LECs, and the other half to "non-wireline" firms, such 
as local broadcasters. 31 
29. E.g., International Networks, Sept. 15, 1987, at 1. 
30. Cellular radio includes both automotive and hand-held telephones. 
31. Cellular Communications System, 86 F.C.C.2d 469 (1981), recon. 89 F.C.C.2d 58, 
recon. 90 F.C.C.2d 571 (1982). The wisdom of this approach is open to question. By giving the 
existing LEC the right to apply for a cellular license with virtually no prospect of a competing 
application, the FCC may have given wireline carriers a headstart in getting on the air as 
indicated by the haste with which non-wireline carriers rushed to form consortia to file uncon-
tested applications. Nevertheless, the basic concept may have some validity. 
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Once again, IBN's very early stage of development impedes draw-
ing any conclusions about potential industry structure. Nevertheless, 
analyzing the range of possibilities may be useful in considering policy 
alternatives. 
A. Provision of Services and Programming by IBN Operators 
Traditional common carrier policy prevents carriers from providing 
or controlling the intelligence transmitted by the carrier. 32 If IBNs 
are treated as quasi-carriers, as once proposed for cable television 
systems, traditional reasons for prohibiting them from providing con-
tent services may be questionable. Indeed, the FCC may experience 
pressure to adopt a cable-type of "hybrid" regulation which allows 
firms to provide their own services, yet provides access rights to third 
parties.33 Taking this stance at the very beginning of IBN's develop-
ment, however, may not be advisable. Indeed, one of the turning 
points in cable regulation may have been the rejection of a 1974 White 
House proposal to regulate cable as a common carrier. 34 
If IBN s exhibit monopoly characteristics, they should not be al-
lowed either to offer their own services or to control third parties' 
content. If an IBN provided programming, it would have an incentive 
to interfere with third-party programmers' services. Indeed, the IBN's 
position would be highly analogous to the BOCs' discrimination against 
the other common carriers (OCCS)35 before the AT&T divestiture. 36 
Until barred from operating cable television systems, the BOCs used 
their control over conduits and poles to delay the entry of cable sys-
tems. 37 
32. Recently, this time-honored principle has been sorely tried by litigation involving use 
of LECs' "976" numbers to transmit sexually provocative recordings, commonly known as "dial-a-
porn." When faced with a congressional mandate to clean up dial-a-porn, the FCC first limited 
it to late night hours, and then, under judicial pressure, required the users to have special 
access codes, and ultimately found itself unable to apply the access code requirement to NYNEX 
because of technological problems. Carlin Communications v. FCC, 787 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1986). 
More recently, the Supreme Court held that Congress could not ban "indecent," as opposed to 
"obscene," material from LECs. Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989). 
33. 47 U.S.C. § 532 (Supp. 1989). 
34. Cabinet Committee on Cable Communications Reports, (1974) (commonly known as "the 
Whitehead Report"). 
35. As the rather inelegant name implies, other common carriers are long-distance telephone 
companies, e.g., MCI, Sprint, competing with AT&T. For a more thorough discussion of the 
firms in this field, see Botein & Pearce, The Competitiveness of the u.s. Telecommunications 
Industry: A New York Case Study, 6 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 233, 243 et. seq. (1988). 
36. Id. 
37. General Tel. of the S.W. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971) (The court held 
that the FCC was acting justifiably and within its statutory authorization by promulgating rules 
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B. Ownership of IBN s 
Prohibiting IBNs from offering their own services and from control-
ling third party content would lessen the severity of ownership con-
cerns. Strict separation of content and conduit should at least remove 
an IBN's incentive to interfere with the third party, since the IBN 
would have nothing to gain. Such a common carrier policy, however, 
might not be a panacea. 38 
Even though a firm may not benefit directly from excluding a 
non-competitive company, it may act coercively to help a parent or 
affiliated company. For example, some of the BOCs' most abusive 
tactics towards OCCs and cable operators occurred under the tightly 
regulated regime of the early 1970s.39 Although the BOCs had little 
or nothing to gain by preventing competition from the OCCs, AT&T 
did. 40 Indeed, the D. C. District Court held that this anti-competitive 
frame of mind had not dissipated as a result of divestiture. 41 Firms 
also attempt to prevent entry where, although currently unable to 
provide a competitive service, the firms anticipate being able to enter 
the market at some later date. The BOCs' antipathy towards cable 
operators, even after the FCC prohibited BOCs from owning cable 
systems,42 indicates that long-term exclusion of competition may be 
an incentive for IBN operators. Common carrier status alone will not 
rule out abuse, if an IBN's parent company has the incentive to injure 
a competitor. Regardless of justifications, common carrier regulation 
per se does not obviate restrictions on IBN ownership. Thus, an at-
tempt to identify types of media firms with an incentive to exclude 
third parties, even under a common carrier regime, may be useful. 
prohibiting telephone companies entering the cable business. The rules prohibited telephone 
companies from providing cable service, either directly or through affilates, and constructing 
cable facilities for independent cable operators unless the carrier first offered such operators 
the option of placing their own cables on the carriers' poles. This decision stemmed 'from a 
concern that common carriers were favoring their own subsidiaries in areas such as pole rentals 
and access to conduit and poles.). 
38. The fact that a market can support only a single firm may justify a firm's acquisition 
of economic power. Official Airline Guides v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1980), eert. denied, 
450 U.S. 917 (1981) held that the then acknowledged "Bible" of airline schedules was justified 
in refusing to list commuter airlines flights, since a natural monopolist was entitled to make 
discretionary decisions on a non-economic basis. To a very real extent the court may have been 
concerned with first amendment notions of "journalistic discretion" and the like. E.g., Miami 
Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
39. See supra note 38. 
40. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525 (D.D.C., 1987). 
41. [d. 
42. See supra note 38. 
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In order to assess potentially dangerous cross-interests, an under-
standing of IBNs' product market, although speculative, is necessary. 
Many observers believe that, at least initially, IBNs will provide video 
programming as the ultimate extension of pay-per-view marketing. 43 
Indeed, the only operational IBN-style facility focuses largely on ran-
dom access programming and videoconferencing. 44 Moreover, in order 
to justify the cost of building IBNs, LEGs may require this type of 
additional revenue from home entertainment programming.45 Finally, 
with the advent of relatively high-speed integrated services digital 
network (ISDN) links, present networks are probably capable of han-
dling all but the largest firms' voice and data transmission needs. 
Thus, IBN s' potential market for these services currently seems rela-
tively small. Alternatively, if IBNs offered competitively priced voice 
and data communication, the discussion below would require some 
expansion. 
With these assumptions in mind, identifying problems with poten-
tial ownership of IBN s by existing industries is possible. In the context 
of IBN, as opposed to telephony, few incentives to interfere with 
third-party services seem to exist. First, since an LEG is a common 
carrier and thus subject to common carrier regulation, many anti-com-
petitive practices will be prevented. More important, since LEGs have 
virtually no experience in marketing video programming or similar 
services, they will have no market to protect. This conclusion is evi-
denced by the BOGs' recent attempt to move into the videotex and 
data base markets, which the D.G. District Gourt soundly rebuffed. 46 
Whether IBN becomes a major provider of voice and data services, 
however, remains to be seen. IflBNs primarily supply video program-
ming, the LEGs would find themselves with little experience, and 
perhaps little incentive, for providing content in addition to carriage. 
Entering the video programming market would place LEGs in direct 
competition with broadcasters, cable operators, and motion picture 
studios - all of which have substantially more background than the 
LEGs in marketing video programming. The LEGs, however, do have 
substantial experience and expertise in the "nuts and bolts" aspect of 
43. See Johnson & Reed, supra note 15, at 14 et. seq. 
44. Gerin, The Biarritz Fiberoptic System, CABLE TV LAW & FINANCE, May 1986, at l. 
45. A high-level BOC executive recently estimated that additional per-customer revenues 
of $30.00 per month would be necessary to pay for the cost of building an IBN. Interestingly 
enough, the average national cost of cable service is just a bit less than this amount. U.S. 
General Accounting Office, Telecommunications: National Survey of Cable Television Rates 
and Services 24, 44 (1989). 
46. Western Electric, 673 F. Supp. at 600-04. 
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making an IBN work. 47 Thus, an LEC's economies of scale might be 
on the hardware rather than software side. Further, any effort by 
the BOCs to offer content probably would repeat their unsuccessful 
attempt to offer data base services to videotex providers. 48 
Much the same reasoning would apply to AT&T and OCCs, which 
also lack experience in producing or marketing video programming, 
and have no immediate incentive to suppress third party IBN users. 
As with the BOCs, history could repeat itself. For example, AT&T's 
suppressed cable development. 49 Apparently, AT&T's long-term in-
terest in entering the cable television business provided only a second-
ary motivation for exclusionary practices. 50 AT&T's primary incentive 
was to coerce cable operators into leasing facilities from the BOCs, 
rather than building their own plants. Thus, a local exchange or long-
distance carrier might be interested in forcing programmers to migrate 
from other facilities, such as cable systems, to its network. 
Presumably, neither the LECs nor the long-distance carriers would 
have this exclusionary incentive in the IBN context. If IBNs lack 
natural monopoly characteristics, competing systems would be feasi-
ble. Thus, an IBN operator presumably would have no reason for 
forcing programmers to use its network, because its operation would 
not be the only one available. 51 On the positive side, long-distance 
carriers have substantial experience with installation of networks in 
general, and of flberoptics in particular. Therefore, like the LECs, 
long-distance carriers may have economies of scale and scope. Con-
sequently, operation of IBNs by either LECs or long-distance provid-
ers seems to pose little danger of excluding competitors and offers at 
least possible economies. 
The current video media, particularly cable television, present an 
almost exactly opposite situation. Cable operators already provide 
video programming, and presumably would compete head-to-head with 
IBNs despite being saddled with low-bandwidth, obsolete, and expen-
sive coaxial cable systems. Moreover, during the last few years many 
cable operators have vertically integrated with program suppliers, as 
shown by the cable industry's ability to prevent third parties from 
offering "pay" and other satellite channels to earth station owners. 52 
47. Nuts and bolts include installation, maintenance, and billing. 
48. Western Electric, 673 F. Supp. at 587-88. 
49. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
50. E.g., California Water & Tel. Co., 13 F.C.C. 2d 40 (1968). 
51. This might not be the case during early IBN deployment, however, while cable systems 
still pose effective competition. 
52. E.g., Broadcasting, Nov. 30, 1987, at 116-117. 
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The cable industry has every reason to view IBN s as potentially 
destructive competition, which provides incentive to either kill or con-
trol IBN s. 53 
If the cable industry dominated IBNs, it would have an incentive 
to exclude third party suppliers. Indeed, cable operators waged a 
largely successful battle to keep third parties off their systems,54 and 
the rather vague "leased access" provisions of the 1984 Cable Act 
seem to provide little relief. Moreover, the cable industry has little 
experience with either switched networks or fiberoptics. United States 
cable systems have "tree and branch" architecture, unlike the tradi-
tional "central office" approach in telephony. Additionally, cable 
operators use fiber only to a very limited extent. 55 
Overall, cable operators seem to have every reason to exclude 
third parties from IBN s, while possessing very little relevant opera-
tional experience. This situation provides some irony, since it mirrors 
the telephone industry's attempts to control cable television two dec-
ades ago. 56 During that time, the cable industry has grown strong 
enough to utilize the same strategy on IBN s. 
Exclusion of cable from IBN ownership, however, would not sound 
the death knell for the cable industry. First, IBNs will develop slowly. 
Second, considering that cable's capital costs would be much lower 
than IBN's, both industries would probably operate side-by-side for 
a long period of time. 57 Finally, the cable industry's increasing vertical 
integration suggests that its ultimate role may be as a program pro-
vider, rather than as a network operator. 
Similar considerations apply to broadcast television networks and 
stations. As with cable operators, indirect sales of video programming 
through advertising revenues give the networks an incentive to 
exclude third parties. Also, though not as vertically integrated as 
some cable operators, the networks have strong ties to program pro-
53. One indication of this is the cable industry's attempt to prevent LECs' from securing 
federal legislation to allow entertainment video services. Broadcasting, Oct. 22, 1990, at 33. 
54. In New York Citizens Comm. on Cable TV v. Manhattan Cable TV, 651 F. Supp. 802 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), the court adopted the novel holding on a motion to dismiss that Time's refusal 
to offer pay services other than its own might violate the antitrust laws. The case ultimately 
was settled. 
55. Cable operators use fiber in their "backbone" trunk lines, rather than in their residential 
distribution plants. To a certain extent, cable's recent, highly-publicized use of fiber may have 
more political than technological value, as a means of arguing that cable can deliver the same 
services as LECs. 
56. See infra note 61. 
57. In the last decade, a large part of the cable industry has incurred the cost of upgrading 
to relatively high-capacity, that is fifty or more channels. 
1990] REGULATION OF FIBEROPTIC INTEGRATED BROADBAND NETWORKS 77 
ducers.58 Conversely, neither networks nor broadcasters have any ex-
perience in operating telecommunications facilities or in constructing 
fiberoptic networks. Thus the networks seem to have potentially con-
flicting interests and no economies of scale or scope. 
In the long run, television networks might be irrelevant, since 
they may not exist by the time that IBN s arrive. Cable's recent 
expansion leads many to predict that mass communications will move 
from over-the-air transmission to cable by the end of the century. 59 
Under this approach, the networks might change from distributors to 
program producers. Even under this scenario, however, networks still 
would have an incentive to exclude competing programs from IBN s. 60 
In terms of cross-ownership policies, LECs and long-distance car-
riers seem to be the most appropriate entities to operate IBN s. Tele-
phone carriers not only have comparatively few conflicts of interest 
with third-party IBN users, but also enjoy some economies of scale. 
Moreover, they probably are better positioned than other media to 
generate the large amounts of capital necessary to build IBN s. While 
cable operators and broadcast entities typically have small cash re-
serves, telephone companies have relatively large amounts. To illus-
trate, the entire cable industry currently has gross revenues roughly 
equal to two of the seven Regional Bell Operating Companies. 
This discussion of cross-ownership naturally has not considered 
other possible rationales for ownership restrictions. At least three 
other types of limitations seem possible: alien ownership, cross-owner-
ship of local and long-distance networks, and ownership of more than 
one IBN. 
First, the Communications Act traditionally prohibits aliens from 
owning more than twenty percent directly, or twenty-five percent 
through a holding company, of any "broadcast or common carrier ... 
license .... "61 The reasons behind the statute are less than clear. 
Apparently, the restrictions stem from an early fear that hostile coun-
tries would use radio to transmit either propaganda or military infor-
mation. 62 In comparison, cable television seems particularly unsuited 
58. Report & Order, 23 F.C.C. 2d 382 (1970). 
59. Broadcasting, Nov. 30, 1987, at 62. 
60. Another consequence of such a development - far .beyond the scope of this paper -
is the effect on poor and rural people, who cannot afford IBN service; this problem is just 
another side of the "universal service" isssue. 
61. 47 U.S.C. § 31O(b) (1982). 
62. Report & Order, 59 F.C.C. 2d 723 (1976). The FCC had discretion not to impose the 
limitations, since the statute refers only to "broadcasters" or "common carriers," and cable is 
neither. 
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for either of these purposes. Thus, the FCC chose not to impose alien 
ownership restrictions upon it. 63 The same logic should apply to IBN s, 
since an IBN operator is unlikely to have as much control as a cable 
operator over use of its system. Moreover, foreign capital could be 
extremely helpful in implementing a capital-intensive enterprise such 
as IBN s. This result would be similar to the significant foreign invest-
ment in the cable industry. Given some countries' intense interest in 
entering the fiberoptics market, investment in a United States IBN 
system could be an attractive means of forging commercial alliances 
and reciprocal dealings. 
Second, whether the same entity should be allowed to own both 
local and long-distance IBN facilities should be considered. The reason-
ing behind the Modification of Final Judgment in the AT&T divesti-
ture was to prevent the possibility of AT&T using an LEC to discrimi-
nate in favor of AT&T and against the OCCS.64 These policy consider-
ations, however, would not apply in the context of IBNs. Traditionally, 
telephony's natural monopoly characteristics are stronger for local than 
long-distance networks, because of the high costs of central office 
facilities. This phenomenon may not exist with IBNs, however, given 
the large bandwidth coupled with the cost of long-distance fiberoptic 
networks. If this situation resulted, ownership of local and long-dis-
tance transmission facilities would create no danger of exclusionary 
tactics, since no potential competition on this level would exist. On 
the other hand, allowing different firms to provide local and long-dis-
tance service might be advisable, solely to increase the number of 
players in the IBN game. Arguably, such a system could lead to better 
research and development. 65 
Finally, limiting the number of local IBN s owned by a single entity 
might be beneficial. Such restrictions would be analogous to the FCC's 
mUltiple broadcast ownership rules, which restrict any entity to a total 
of twelve AM, FM, and TV stations, or television coverage of twenty-
five percent of the population.66 Alternatively, IBN s probably will be 
much more passive than broadcasting in terms of program content 
control. Thus, the FCC's refusal to impose multiple ownership limita-
63. Id. 
64. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 131. 
65. For example, total combined funding of R&D by AT&T and the BOCs increased after 
divestiture. Noll, Bell Systems R&D Activities: The Impact of Divestiture, TELECOMMUNICA. 
TIONS POLICY, June, 1987, at 161. 
66. 47 C.F.R. § 73.636 (1987). 
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tions on cable,67 which is probably far less passive than future IBNs, 
militates against multiple ownership restrictions on IBNs. If IBNs 
ultimately become the sole means for providing video programming 
and are not common carriers, however, traditional first amendment 
diversity principles would support common ownership limitations. 68 In 
addition, diversification of ownership would benefit research, develop-
ment, and innovation. 
The advent of IBN s raises a number of difficult and unanswerable 
questions. Which entities should be allowed to own IBNs? Should the 
same entity own both local and long-distance facilities? Should a limit 
on multiple ownership of IBNs be imposed? As with other IBN policy 
issues, only tentative observations are possible at this early stage. 
IV. REGULATION OF RATES AND PRACTICES 
If IBNs are treated as common carrier, regulation of their rates 
and practices would be appropriate, if not inevitable. Regulators re-
view rates not only to insure that the public receives the benefits of 
a natural monopoly's declining cost curve, but also to prevent a 
monopolist from manipulating its rate structure to exclude competi-
tion.69 Similar concerns underlie scrutiny of a firm's practices in dealing 
with both the public and third-party users. Despite these traditional 
concerns, IBNs may avoid close regulation of either rates or practices. 
A. Rates 
Unlike in the past, classification of an entity as a common carrier 
does not necessarily subject it to rate-of-return regulation. In the 
past, rate regulation effectively meant rate-based rate-of-return reg-
ulation. 70 Under the traditional approach, a regulatory agency first 
determines a firm's expenses, then establishes the value of its plant 
67. This policy may face reexamination in the future; as a result of recent mergers and 
acquisitions, a handful of firms control more than half of the cable subscribers in the country. 
In general, the FCC has shied away from multiple ownership restrictions for new video and 
media, on the ground that they are still developmental. Report & Order, 52 P&F Rad. Reg. 
2d 257 (1982). 
68. E.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (Involved an anti-trust 
challenge to Associated Press (AP) by-laws which prohibited AP members from selling news 
to non-members and granted existing members the ability to block competitors from gaining 
membership. The court stated "The fact that the publisher handles news while others handle 
food does not ... afford the publisher a peculiar constitutional sanctuary in which he can with 
impunity violate laws regulating business practices."). 
69. Phillips, supra, note 17, at 51-63. 
70. Id. 
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(the rate base), and finally sets a rate of return sufficient to attract 
future investments. 71 This approach has been less than popular with 
regulators, firms, and the public. 72 All stages of the ratemaking process 
involve often inevitable decisions. Consequently, many regulators 
seem to resign themselves to simply making rough guesses; some 
agencies routinely and Solomonicly give firms half of their requests. 
In response to this disenchantment and deregulation, many agen-
cies moved away from rate-of-return regulation. 73 The FCC requires 
only "dominant" carriers, which essentially refers to AT&T, to justify 
their rates. 74 Recently, the FCC totally scrapped rate regulation of 
long-distance carriers except for core or basic services. In its place, 
the FCC adopted a "price cap" approach, under which a carrier may 
set any rate that falls under a predetermined maximum. 75 Thus, today 
a relatively wide range of alternative regulatory schemes exists for 
common carriers, ranging from the traditional rate-of-return regulation 
to the recent price cap approach. 
At this early stage in IBN development, what, if any, regulation 
would be appropriate for the IBN industry is difficult to determine. 
Due to economic and political reasons, however, to assume that IBNs 
would necessarily be subject to some form of regulation is fair. First, 
an IBN owned or operated by an established common carrier, creates 
the possibility of cross-subsidy. From a practical stand point, regula-
tion of the parent would necessarily include regulation of the sub-
sidiary. Similarly, prevention of an IBN from discriminating against 
competitors would require some regulatory scrutiny. 
Although IBNs probably will be subject to some sort of regulation, 
it is likely that the regulation will be relatively lenient. First, as a 
new industry, minimal regulation would be required to provide IBN s 
with the flexibility needed to respond to new and changing market 
conditions. 76 Second, IBN's status as a newcomer indicates that rate-of-
return regulation would be enigmatic. Since no real bench-marks exist, 
it would be difficult, if not impossible, for a regulatory agency to make 
informed decisions as to the reasonableness of either revenues or ex-
penses. For example, an IBN conceivably would have higher promo-
71. [d. at 229-377. 
72. See generally, THE CRISIS OF THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS: AN INTRODUCTION 
TO A CURRENT ISSUE OF PUBLIC POLICY 30-56 (P.W. MacAvoyed. 1970). 
73. L. JOHNSON, PRICE CAPS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION REFORM (1989). 
74. MCI Communications v. FCC, 917 F.2d 30 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
75. First Report & Order, 85 F.C.C. 2d 1 (1980); Notice of Inquiry, 3 F.C.C. Red. 3195 
(1988). 
76. Initially, IBN s would have to generate substantial profits in order to attract capital. 
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tional costs than a long-established LEC, thus necessitating a higher 
rate of return. Assuming that IBN s resemble today's essentially unre-
gulated cable industry, IBNs would arguably need an initial rate-of-re-
turn on the order of twenty-five percent, as opposed to twelve or 
thirteen percent now common in the telephone industry. 
Most regulatory agencies have jurisdiction over discrimination as 
well as "unjust or unreasonable charges."77 At least initially, the pri-
mary role of IBN rate regulation would be the former rather than 
the latter. This approach would protect IBNs' competitors, while pre-
serving IBNs' flexibility. Moreover, extending any rate-of-return to 
a new industry would be difficult since the method is sufficiently dated. 
B. Practices 
In IBN regulation, guaranteeing access to IBNs by third-party-
programmers is probably the most important consideration. This 
guarantee would insure full use of IBN's bandwidth which compares 
to dozens of cable television systems. As a result of this broad 
bandwidth, a host of new program producers and packagers might 
arise. 
1. Access Characteristics 
The basic concept of access differs with respect to IBN s and tele-
phony. In the latter, access involves the ability to interconnect with 
an LEC's central office in order to transmit messages over the local 
network, such as by a long distance carrier. 78 IBNs, however, vary 
in two respects. First, IBN s' broad bandwidth will greatly diminish 
the importance of switches. 79 Second, IBN suppliers may need to use 
particular blocks of spectrum at specific times, such as video program-
ming during prime viewing time. From a supplier's perspective, access 
concerns with IBN s thus may resemble those in the cable rather than 
in the telephone industry. 
In contrast, IBN consumers probably will resemble telephone more 
than cable subscribers. To the extent that IBN users are provided 
with interactive applications, such as teleconferencing, the distinction 
between IBN s' program suppliers and program consumers will be 
more obscure than in the cable industry. From this perspective, IBN 
access concerns most likely will parallel those in today's telephone 
industry. Since access concerns represent a hybrid of the traditional, 
77. E.g., 47 u.s.c. § 201(b) (1982). 
78. E.g., AT&T, 552 F.2d at 13l. 
79. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
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yet differing, issues in the cable and telephone industries, an appropri-
ate access scheme would likely be less stringent than traditional tele-
phone tariffs, but more exacting than cable access requirements. 
2. Probable Access Schemes 
Obviously, a central part of any access scheme for IBN s will require 
that an IBN operator provide users with bandwidth not only on de-
mand, but also at a non-discriminatory price. The reason for requiring 
bandwidth on demand is based on the anticipated structure of an IBN. 
Unlike contemporary cable operators, if IBNs achieve high capacity, 
an IBN operator could provide as much capacity as required without 
impairing its ability to sell programming. Consequently, only a minimal 
scheme would be required to insure access, since third-party users 
would receive any requested capacity. 
Prevention of IBN operators from attempting to exclude com-
petitors justifies the nondiscriminatory pricing requirement. If an 
IBN's charges were too high, a regulatory agency could invoke its 
power to police "unreasonable" or "unjust" rates. 80 However, judg-
ments as to reasonableness would require considerable development 
in the IBN industry. 
Additionally, problems might exist if IBN operators charged differ-
ent rates at different times of the day. To the extent that IBNs have 
aspects of the mass media, some times of the day would be more 
valuable than others. If an IBN operator had enough capacity to fulfill 
all requests, however, little reason for imposing price differentials to 
ration scarce resources would exist. Yet, positing virtually unlimited 
channel capacity seems highly optimistic. After all, the FCC once 
hailed cable television "an economy of abundance. "81 The reality, how-
ever, is a fierce battle by cable operators to keep third parties off 
their channels. 82 
If demand exceeds supply with IBN s, like every other video 
medium, a more formal access scheme would be necessary.sa However, 
experience with cable television access schemes provides two valuable 
lessons. First, most commentators fail miserably in proposing workable 
access schemes.84 Second, though many cable operators willingly deal 
80. E.g., 47 U.S.C. § 201 (1982). 
81. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 25 F.C.C. 2d 38, 39 (1970). 
82. See supra note 14. 
83. See supra note 67. 
84. For a particularly disastrous attempt, see Botein, Access to Cable Television, 57 COR-
NELL L. REV. 419 (1972). 
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with non-commercial access requests, commercial access users receive 
short shrift, despite the absence of actual competition with a vertically 
integrated cable operator's programming. B5 Thus, unless IBN develops 
far more than an "economy of abundance," the prospects for creating 
a workable IBN access scheme are not particularly bright. 
v. CONCLUSION 
With IBN s or any other new technology, all regulatory bets are 
off. The cable television experience shows the unpredictability of media 
evolution. Nevertheless, a few general observations may be in order. 
On a very simplistic level, common carrier status for IBN s appears 
to resolve all the policy problems. 86 Taking IBN operators out of the 
programming business removes their incentives to exclude or censor 
competitors. But the common carrier cure not only may be a bit too 
attractive, it also may ignore two critical concerns. First, even if IBN s 
lack natural monopoly characteristics, if owned by a common carrier, 
an IBN might be regulated as a monopoly. Second, common carrier 
treatment of IBN s may not remove all incentives to exclude com-
petitors, particularly if an IBN's parent company has present or future 
interests in marketing content. 
Regardless of whether or not IBN s should have carrier status and 
despite a lack of natural monopoly characteristics, IBN s probably will 
have sufficient market power to require some type of governmental 
oversight. If IBN s develop virtually unlimited bandwidth, the degree 
of governmental intrusion might be rather limited. Thus, IBN s might 
become the electronic equivalent of the pre-Revolutionary War press, 
which supported a number of competing newspapers. However, if 
IBNs fail to fulfill their technological promise, IBNs may face the 
same regulatory problems as the other electronic media. Thus, IBNs 
would require the creation of yet another new regulatory scheme. 
85. Indeed, the 1984 Cable Act virtually institutionalizes a cable operator's ability to exclude 
its competitors by providing that a cable operator may set terms for third-party "leased access" 
which "assure that such use will not adversely affect the operation, financial condition, or market 
development of the cable system." 47 u.s.c. § 612(c)(l) (Supp. 1989). 
86. Once again, common carrier status also was touted as the panacea for cable television. 
See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Whether it would have fulfilled its promise in what 
has become an intensely entrepreneurial industry is less than clear. 

